



































Consider the problem of planning your vacation next sum-
mer.  Your travel agent tells you that there are two types of 
vacation packages available at the destination of your choice: 
"rigid" and "flexible". Under the "rigid" package you have to 
specify exactly the dates of your vacation.  Under the 
"flexible" package, you can go for any seven consecutive 
days between May 1st and September 30th.  Furthermore, 
the flexible package is 80% refundable. How much more 
would you pay for the flexible package?  This is one of the 
innumerable questions that can be answered by real options. 
The main purpose of the Real Options approach to manage-
ment is to explicitly recognize and estimate the value of 
flexibility, and to optimize decisions requiring giving up, or 
creating, flexibility.  
 
A Real Options approach to management and strategic man-
agement in particular considers strategic decision making as 
a process aimed first at actively reducing exposition to 
downside risk and second at actively promoting exposition to 
upside opportunities. The Real Options approach to manage-
ment stands at the hinge between pure finance and softer ar-
eas of decision making under risk such as project evaluation, 
market entry and exit, organizational restructuring and re-
engineering, technology adoption, etc. The approach under-
lines a frame of mind and uses methodologies that appeal to 
a wide array of managers, thus providing a common lan-
guage. Real options have applications in many areas that are 
central to modern corporations : market coverage and devel-
opment, finance, human resources management, technology 
management, R&D and knowledge management, etc. The 
approach represents a major shift in strategic management 
but remains relatively unknown in spite of its adoption by 
firms such as Airbus, GE, Hewlett Packard, Intel, Toshiba 
and others.   
 
 
As is clear from the following quotes, the real-option meth-
odology is emerging as a potentially powerful tool for the 
executive. However this potential will only be realized by 
decision makers who combine the “real option state of mind” 
with thorough technical skills and a good information sys-
tem. The implementation of a Real Options approach could 
be very valuable but at the same time is a challenging task. 
“Enron President and Chief Operating Officer Jeffrey K. Skilling 
credits real-options thinking with helping Enron transform itself 
from a U.S. natural-gas pipeline company into a global wheeler-
dealer that trades commodities including gas, electricity, water, 
and, most recently, telecom bandwidth.” 
(Business Week, June 7, 2000) 
“To evaluate potential projects, they almost invariably have to resort to 
a theory of corporate finance called the “Capital Asset Pricing 
Model” (CAPM). Yet real-life managers tend not to like this model, 
for the simple reason that it ignores the value of real-life managers. So 
they might welcome some recent academic work. In the ivory tower, 
they are talking about ditching the CAPM for a rival, called “real-
options theory”, that places managers at its very core. More 
fundamentally, the flaw in the CAPM is that it implicitly assumes that 
when firms buy new assets, they hold these passively for the life of 
the project. But they do not. Instead, they employ managers precisely 
in order to react to events as they unfold. Obviously, this managerial 
flexibility must be worth something. Options on “real” assets (and 
indeed poker bets) behave rather like options on financial assets (puts 
and calls on shares or currencies, say). The similarities are such that 
they can, at least in theory, be valued according to the same 
methodology. There is a snag, of course: sheer complexity. Pricing 
financial options is daunting, but valuing real options is harder still. 
Their term, unlike that of financial options, is usually open-ended or 
undefinable. The volatility of the underlying asset can be difficult to 
measure or guess, especially since it is not always clear what it is-if, 
for example, it is yet to be invented. How can one define the 
appropriate benchmark asset-class in the case of a new drug for a rare 
disease? And there may be additional variables to consider, such as 
the strategic benefit of pre-empting a rival.”                 
(The Economist, August 14, 2000)￿
 











































“The real option approach emphasizes that many investments create 
important, follow-on opportunities that a company may or may not 
subsequently exploit. Consequently, the real option approach highlights 
value that is contingent on earlier investments. For instance, while a given 
R&D investment may have a very low or even negative net present value, 
it may also provide platforms for future, favorable investments. Real 
options bear some other similarities to financial options. For example, the 
value of both types of options increases with uncertainty. Further, by 
providing managers discretion - rights but not obligations - financial and 
real options can help companies limit their downside risk while also 
gaining access to upside opportunities in the future. However, unlike 
financial options, real options come into existence by the opportunities 
created by the company’s strategic investments. Because their underlying 
assets do not trade in liquid markets, real options also present unique 
valuation challenges.”                  (Financial Times, May 9, 2000) 
“Real options analysis is based on the observation, first made more than 
20 years ago, that a company evaluating an existing asset or potential 
investment is in much the same position as the holder of a financial 
option, such as those written on stocks or commodity prices. The holder of 
a financial put option on, say, the price of oil can exercise that option if 
the price rises above a pre-agreed level, but doesn’t have to if the price 
falls. Similarly, the owner of a marginally profitable oil field has the right 
to exploit it if the price of oil rises, but is not obliged to do so if it doesn’t. 
That observation leads to the assumption that the future value of such an 
investment can be best valued in a similar way to financial options, rather 
than by simply discounting the cash flows expected from it in future. In 
particular, option valuation takes into account the risks and rewards of 
future uncertainty, or volatility, which traditional discounted cash flow 
(DCF) models do not.”  
                   (The Wall Street Journal, Feb 22 and 24, 2000). 
“Exploit hidden assets and you will succeed. Neglect them and you will 
wind up with a collection of old nags. What kind of hidden assets do I 
mean? For example, the unexploited opportunities to add a new product 
line, expand overseas or engage in e-commerce are hidden assets that do 
not appear on a company’s financial statements and have not yet 
contributed to its profits. When you buy a company, you often get these 
features for free. I call them “real options,” an analogy to the financial 
options traded in Chicago. There’s a big difference, though. Financial 
options remain valuable when held by passive investors. But owning a 
business is not a passive exercise. The owner has a real job to do, 
providing governance, managing capital and helping a business achieve 
its potential.”            (Forbes magazine, May 29, 2000) 
“Real options - akin to financial options but for non-financial or real 
assets - are handy in limiting downside risk and capturing positive 
opportunities. Their effectiveness, however, is subject to a number of 
limitations. Many companies may not appreciate the options embedded 
in their investments. Others lack the capabilities to value real options and 
use them in allocating resources. International joint ventures supposedly 
enhance flexibility and reduce risk while multinational networks provide 
the enterprise with switching options.” (Financial Times, May 9, 2000)￿
“Real-options analysis rewards flexibility and that’s what makes it 
better than today’s standard decision-making tool, “net present value.” NPV 
calculates the value of a project by predicting its payouts, adjusting them 
for risk, and subtracting the investment outlay. But by boiling down all the 
possibilities for the future into a single scenario, NPV doesn’t account for 
the ability of executives to react to new circumstancesCfor instance, spend 
a little up front, see how things develop, then either cancel or go full speed 
ahead.”      (Business Week, June 7, 2000)￿
 
MORE QUOTES FROM THE BUSINESS PRESS : 
￿ 
As a direct outgrowth of finance, the Real Options approach 
uses techniques and methodologies which prevail in that field. 
However, finance is mostly preoccupied with evaluating and 
pricing financial instruments, put and call options among them. 
As the Real Options approach percolates into various areas of 
management and decision making, there is a shift of emphasis 
from pure evaluation to decision analysis and optimization.  
 
The origin of the Real Options approach can be traced back to 
the remark by Steward Myers that holding a real investment 
project like the construction of a plant was formally similar to 
holding a financial call option. A construction project involves 
the option, but not the obligation, to spend resources at some 
future time in order to obtain an asset (an operating plant) 
whose value is normally stochastic. The randomness of a finan-
cial option arises from the fact that the underlying asset is usu-
ally a stock, so that, at the time the option is acquired, it is not 
clear whether the known exercise price will be lower or higher 
than the still unknown stock price in the future; thus the option 
may never be exercised. Similarly, if the price of the projected 
plant’s output does not evolve favorably, or if investigations 
reveal that operating costs would be high, then it is not worth 





The distinction between option evaluation and decision making 
is only a matter of emphasis. In fact evaluation requires solving 
the decision problem raised by the option: should it be exer-
cised and when? But the distinction is important: it underlines 
that good decision making creates value. As we argue further 
below, applying the Real Options approach to decision making 
in organizations creates value. This approach brings the disci-
pline of finance into other areas of corporate, public, or individ-
ual activities. 
 
Another difference between financial options and real options 
arises from the nature of the uncertainty affecting the underly-
ing asset. In the world of financial options, uncertainty is all 
about future stock prices; it is valuable due to the limited down-
side and unlimited upside fluctuations of the pay-off, fluctua-
tions that are linked to the exogenous (outside the control of the 
managers) variability or volatility of the price of the underlying 
financial assets.  In the world of real options, uncertainty has 
value because of the ability of executives to manage the uncer-
tainty of projects. In a world without uncertainty, managers 
would not be needed. Executives add value to the firm because 
they actively manage change as uncertainty unfolds over time. 
The Real Options approach attempts to quantify that value, that 
is, the value of active management of uncertainty by managers.  
 
This crucial difference in the nature of uncertainty has its coun-
terpart in the nature of the information that needs to be used for 
option evaluation and management. For financial options, most 
of the time long and frequent data series are available about 
stock prices. For a real option such as the construction of a pro-
duction plant, the uncertainty arises from future prices or pro-
duction costs; for the vacation package mentioned earlier, it is 
your time availability that is uncertain. While product prices 
may have some similarity with stock prices, they are not usually 
recorded with the same accuracy, nor are they driven by the 
same factors. When it comes to costs evaluation or to a person’s 
availability for vacation, both the form and the nature of the 
data available are fundamentally different. 
 
There are also differences in the institutional environment char-
acterizing the option evaluation and decision making problem. 
 
THE LINK BETWEEN REAL OPTIONS AND 
FINANCE
￿
Call Option on Stock               Real Option on Project 
Current value of stock                 (Gross) PV of expected cash flow 
Exercise price                              Investment cost 
Time to expiration                       Time until opportunity disappears 
Stock value uncertaintyt rate       Project value uncertainty                
Risk free interest rate                  Risk free interest rates 
Factors affecting the value of financial and real options An important one is that financial markets are often rich and 
dense enough that appropriate portfolios of existing traded as-
sets can duplicate the risks associated with the asset underlying 
a particular option. It is under such circumstances that the cele-
brated Black-Scholes-Merton approach is applicable. In the 
case of many real options, this so-called ‘spanning’ assumption 
cannot be invoked so that other techniques, such as stochastic 
dynamic programming, must be used instead of the contingent 
claims approach prevalent in financial applications.  
 
Although widely used in finance,  techniques such as stochastic 
dynamic optimization are by far not specific to that field. Being 
used by managers and engineers as well, they often constitute a 
common tool and language by which real option techniques and 
methodologies are spreading more easily from finance into 
other areas.  
 
Certainly, the technical dimension of option evaluation is im-
portant and is part of the conceptual breakthrough that was re-
warded by a Nobel price. But beyond techniques, the Real Op-
tions approach is mostly a way of thinking and adjusting one’s 
behavior accordingly:  
 recognition that uncertainty creates opportunities and 
value;  
 recognition that such value requires adequate deci-
sions in order to materialize;  
 identification of the sources of uncertainty and col-
lection of information;  
 identification of the decisions (options) that promote 
exposition to favorable outcomes  
 identification of the decisions that reduce exposure to 
downside risk;  
 establishment of optimum decision rules. 
 
A Real Options approach helps executives quantify the value of 
active management. As standard static NPV calculations typi-
cally are based on the discounted value of average outcomes, 
the ability of executives to actively manage a project is not ac-
counted for, and the static NPV will typically underestimate the 
true NPV of a project. Active management limits the downside 
and enhances the upside of the distribution of the NPV out-
comes and can possibly change the expected NPV from nega-
tive to positive as the graph below illustrates. The upshot is that 
if the traditional static NPV approach is taken, then truly profit-
able projects are not implemented causing shareholder value of 
the firm to be less than optimal. 
 
 
Project evaluation is the most obvious application of the Real 
Options approach, although by no mean the only one or the ma-
jor one. Before the Real Options approach, the standard valua-
tion procedure was discounted net present value. The Real Op-
tions approach is best seen as an improvement to conventional 
discounted net present value determination; it does not invali-
date the procedure but amends the way it is applied. In fact it 
rationalizes what many evaluators are already doing on intuitive 
grounds:  
 attach importance to the timing of decisions;  
 identify and evaluate downside risks and upside opportu-
nities associated with the project;  
 identify, evaluate, and optimize future decisions that 
may affect exposition to downside or upside fluctua-
tions; 
 to sum up: optimally manage the creation and use of 
 
Project evaluation and real options
￿
Knowledge of real options empowers managers with the 
tools to calculate more accurate net present values (NPV) 
and thus make better strategic business decisions. One can 
think of calculating the Strategic NPV of a project defined 
as : 
 
Standard static NPV 
+ 
Option premium from active management 
= 
Strategic NPV 
Real Options and active management  
Once these dimensions of the project are introduced, projects be-
come proactive instruments that modify the way uncertainty af-
fects results in the decision maker’s favor. Proper evaluation of 
costs and benefits always was crucial in conventional net present 
value evaluation. In a Real Options approach, costs and benefit 
evaluation becomes more difficult. Options created by the project 
now enter as benefits; options used up by the project enter as 
costs. In both cases these options must be valued and in most 
cases such evaluation involves finding the optimal way to decide 
whether and when the option must be created or used up. 
 
The box entitled “Evaluation of a flexible vacation package” 
illustrates the basic evaluation method of both financial and real 
options. Both standard textbook put option evaluations and the 
vacation package example are overly simplistic. Their main 
weakness is perhaps that they consider situations where, although 
valuation is an issue, the decision that confers its value to the op-
tion (sell the stock; take the trip) is obvious in each case. In most 
real situations the decision whether and when to exercise the op-
tion is the outcome of a complex optimization process which 
maximizes the value of the option. 
 
However simple, these illustrations do demonstrate how the 
methodology developed for analyzing financial options can be 
applied to real world problems. In fact the difference between 
choosing a flexible flight package and an interruptible power sup-
ply scheme is not great. Of course, both the financial and the real 
options valuation methodologies utilize substantially richer de-
scriptions of the uncertainty and employ more realistic assump-
tions.  In the rest of our discussion, we mention and sometimes 
analyze several cases when real options have been or could be 
successfully applied to improve management decision-making.   
All of those cases are substantially more complicated than the 
above example.  The basic underlying objective remains to opti-
mally manage the creation and use of flexibility as a device to 
exploit uncertainty. This involves the following steps: 
 
 identification of the sources of uncertainty and collection 
of information;  
 identification of the relevant future decisions;  
 construction of optimum decision rules. 
 
 
Your travel agent offers you two types of vacation packages 
to the destination of your choice: "rigid" and "flexible."   
Under the "rigid" package you have to specify exactly the 
dates of your vacation.  Under the "flexible" package, you 
can go for any seven consecutive days between May 1st and 
September 30th.  Furthermore, the flexible package is 80% 
refundable.  How much more would you pay for the flexible 
package?  To simplify the problem, imagine you know for 
sure you will be able to take a week off this summer, but 
you don’t know whether it will be in July or August.  You 
estimate that each month has an equal probability of being 
convenient.  Assume further that a week’s vacation to the 
destination is worth $10,000 more than your next best alter-
native (a week at the cottage).  Since you don’t know which 
month will be convenient, you toss a coin, and you pick July 












Since both July and August have equal probability of being 
convenient, ignoring risk, the maximum you would pay for 
the rigid package is $5,000  =  (½ $10,000 + ½ $0).   Con-
sider now the flexible package.  It allows you to take your 
vacation any time this summer.  So, the payoffs to the 













Either way, you take your vacation, so you would be will-
ing to pay $10,000 for the flexible package.  In this spe-
cific example, the value of flexibility is as big as the value 
of the package itself.  This is not unrealistically high: a 
flexible fully refundable airline ticket with open dates may 
cost as much as ten times a rigid non-refundable ticket with 
fixed dates.   
July good: $10,000 
August good: $0 (can’t use the rigid package at all) 
??? 
August good: $10,000 
??? 
July good: $10,000 
Evaluation of a flexible vacation package  
A good strategic plan is a plan that build real options into the 
foreseeable future, medium and long, of the firm and sets up 
an optimized decision making process to fruitfully exploit 
those options.  Again, real options should be recognized, built 
in and evaluated for each major step of every project : alli-
ances, acquisitions and mergers, spin-offs, technology devel-
opment and management, organizational restructuring, etc.   
The value of strategic planning itself is determined by the 
quality of the real options designed and imbedded in the plan 
and by the quality of the evaluation procedure of those real 
options.  It is in this precise sense that the design and manage-
ment of real options, through the exploitation of uncertainty, 
create value for the firm and that they represent the most im-
portant responsibilities of the managers in determining a stra-
tegic plan. 
 
Strategic planning is an exercise in managing flexibility. Plans 
should specify decision nodes,  that is future steps that may or 
may not be taken, at dates that may be given but are mostly to 
be chosen optimally. Furthermore, preparing a strategic plan is 
not a passive exercise in anticipating the future; it is an exer-
cise in shaping the future or, more precisely, an exercise in 
preparing the way, in due time, the future will unfold to the 
decision maker’s advantage. That is, managers are planting the 
seeds of future flexibility by identifying and creating real op-
tions. This is again a key difference between real options and 
financial options: with real options, managers are creating the 
tool or using existing tools in highly creative ways; in the case 
of financial options financial executives usually pick their 
tools in the – sometimes highly exotic – kit of available instru-
ments. 
 
One important characteristic of real options in an oligopolistic 
environment is that they may have a negative value. As men-
tioned before, the value of real options derives from the active 
management of projects variations as uncertainty unfolds over 
course of a given project imply that commitment to develop 
and eventually complete the project is relatively low.  This 
lack of commitment may invite more aggressive behavior from 
competitors whose objective may be to drive the firm out of 
the project or market, or more aggressive attacks from the op-
ponents to the project.  Active management means that some 
options should be closed while others are kept open.  It is a 
major responsibility of high level managers to identify which 
options should be closed in favor of strong commitment and 
which options should be kept open in order to be more able to 





The Real Options approach uses all the mathematics of fi-
nance. However standard financial techniques and procedures 
cannot always be applied in the Real Options context. The 
most frequent reasons are that real risks cannot always be re-
produced by market instruments so that equilibrium methods 
such as the Black-Scholes-Merton method are not valid; data 
on the underlying asset (project value) are not available in as 
convenient forms as financial data; the identification of avail-
able options often requires analyses that involve other fields of 
economics, and other disciplines in management, organization, 
engineering, etc..  
 
Consequently the array of techniques and procedures involved 
in the Real Options approach is typically wider than in finan-
cial options. Decision tree analysis with optimized decisions at 
various nodes, and  stochastic dynamic programming are 
prevalent techniques, usually applied numerically. Stochastic 
dynamic programming, as a mathematical tool, is much in the 
spirit of the Real Options approach: it seeks the maximization 
of a stochastic value function that can be interpreted as the 
value of the firm or the project, and depends on optimal deci-
sions to be taken in the future upon the realization of events 
 
STRATEGIC PLANNING AND REAL OPTIONS 
￿
 
 REAL OPTIONS: NEW TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES
￿evaluation. As an optimization tool it is already widely used in 
such areas as inventory management, reservoir management, 
etc., so that a Real Options approach may be within the reach 
of personal with no training in finance. 
 
Stochastic dynamic programming rely on the quality of infor-
mation. The analyst must identify each step and characterize 
each decision in terms of its probabilistic effect on the state 
variables, its cost, its information content, its degree of reversi-
bility or flexibility.  Such information are usually highly proj-
ect specific so that each project may require a substantial in-
vestment in data collection and analysis. 
 
Often the analysis must go beyond data. Fully-fledged indus-
trial analysis is warranted when decisions are truly strategic: 
competition, preemption, signal extraction motives, asymmet-
ric information, etc. then become key issues. The evaluation of 
a new “plant” development project should yield different re-
sults, other things equal, when the new plant is explicitly con-
sidered as an addition to an existing portfolio of “plants”, in 
the firm itself and in the industry as a whole. Similarly the 
evaluation of a new aircraft project involves strategic choices 
best addressed by real option evaluations.  
 
Another important tool of the Real Options approach is simu-
lation. For example, with adequate data on past demand or on 
past water replenishment rates, one can generate fictive sam-
ples of possible future demand trajectories or water levels. A 
promising new technique first developed for financial applica-
tions (Longstaff, F. and E. S. Schwartz, “Valuing American 
Options by Simulation: A Simple Least-Squares Approach”, 
mimeo, UCLA, 1998.) and adapted to real situations at CI-













The following integrated example of a specific manufacturing 
problem involves several real options that are identified and 
described briefly in the foregoing section. The boxes provide 
more detailed analyses for the interested reader.  
 
Manufacturing companies often have the option to produce 
some of the energy they need. In the example discussed now a 
firm faces a choice between three industrial boilers to generate 
steam. The first boiler burns natural gas, the second burns No. 
2 fuel oil, and the third can be switched between the two in-
puts.  
 
The first two boilers illustrate the traditional trade off between 
operating costs and acquisition cost. Whether or not one domi-
nates the other depends on future fuel prices. Evaluating and 
comparing them for immediate acquisition requires forecasting 
future input prices but does not require investigating any par-
ticular future decision: once acquired, there is only one way to 
operate either technology. 
 
The value of technological flexibility: the fuel switching op-
tion. The third boiler involves additional flexibility. As the 
first two, its value depends on future fuel prices; but in addi-
tion its value depends on the rule that will be used for switch-
ing between fuels in the future; that rule must be optimized 
and its proper choice confers value to the technology. In con-
trast with the acquisition of either one of the first two tech-
nologies, acquiring the flexible technology creates the option 
to switch between fuels in the future according to future fuel 
prices. Since future fuel prices are not currently known, future 
switching dates cannot be built into the project for evaluation. 
However the rule determining switching may be selected and 
the expected value of owning the boiler, conditional on that 




A more elaborate illustration 
￿The value of waiting: the timing option. While acquiring one 
of the first two technologies does not create any option, the 
Real Options approach applies to them nevertheless. This is 
because their acquisition uses up an option: before acquiring a 
boiler, the firm has the flexibility to buy any boiler, or to wait 
and see; once the boiler is purchased there is no way back. 
Consequently, whatever the boiler selected, its acquisition is 
the exercise of an option. The timing of the acquisition, to-
gether with the choice of one particular technology, need to be 
optimized. As with the switching option, the decision maker 
does not choose a date but an optimal decision rule that will be 
used for the choice of the acquisition date. 
 
Combining real and financial options. A firm that owns a sin-
gle fuel burner may use financial instruments to insure itself 
against fuel price fluctuations. For example if it owns a gas 
burner, it may buy a hedge that guarantees it to be able to pur-
chase gas at some prescribed price should the spot price ex-
ceed that ceiling.  
 
Such hedges may also be considered if the firm owns a dual-
fuel burner. They would be used as an insurance against the 
risk of needing to incur the fuel switching cost. If such insur-
ance is available at reasonable cost, this will affect the optimal 
switching rule determined in the absence of any financial in-
strument. The firm will be able to let the gas/oil price ratio 
increase to a value higher before switching to oil and vice-
versa for gas. 
 
Thus the availability of financial instruments may alter real 
management, just as insurance may alter management in gen-
eral. This in turns affects the value of the flexible technology: 
the better the available contracts, the lower the value of real 
flexibility.  
 
Similarly, the more flexibility, the less insurance is needed. 
Flexible technology, flexible organization, flexible activities, 
etc. are all possible substitutes for insurance combined with 
rigidity. Self insurance is not only the ability to withstand ad-
verse occurrences, but also the ability to reduce their impact by 
 
From the single machine to the plant portfolio. In the decision 
sequence presented above, the Real Options approach helps 
evaluate the value of flexibility in a boiler. The operating rule 
is described in a rigorous fashion, and the decision whether to 
invest into such a boiler is optimized. 
 
The Real Options approach can be applied in the same spirit to 
decisions of a much wider scope. Acquiring a gas-fired power 
plant may have a different value to one utility than to another 
depending on the existing plant portfolio of each firm. Con-
ventional NPV evaluation would not capture such a difference.  
 
For example if one power plant technology is affected by cli-
mate change (hydro power) while another technology is af-
fected by fossil fuel cost (gas-fired plant), the same plant, to be 
used to serve the same market will probably be worth less to a 
firm that already owns several plants of the same type than to a 
firm that does not. This is so for two reasons. The first one is 
the conventional reason associated with financial portfolio 
construction: the market value of the new plant would have a 
different correlation with the assets of one firm than with the 
assets of the other firm. The second reason, emphasized by 
real options, is that each firm would choose a different way to 
manage the new plant if it acquired it. Under conditions unfa-
vorable to operating that plant, the firm with few similar plants 
could switch it off while serving demand with other equip-
ment, while the other firm could not. The Real Options ap-
proach helps determine more precisely how this should be 
done and what the implications for plant and firm evaluation 




When a project involves several options, each future option confers value to earlier ones. Hence the evaluation of 
future options must precede the evaluation of current options. We start with the fuel switching option, focusing on 
the following question. Suppose that the firm acquires the third boiler now; what is the value of its flexibility? What 
is the switching rule that confers its value to that flexibility? The answer to both questions depends on currently 
known parameters such as current prices, discount rate, uncertainty, as described now. 
 
The boilers may be described by their acquisition price and their efficiency-adjusted price of fuel. The efficiency-
adjusted price of fuel is the spot price of the relevant fuel times a factor that reflects the thermal efficiency of the 
boiler. 
 
The price of the first boiler is $63,500 and its efficiency-adjusted price of fuel is 1469Pgaz. The price of the second 
boiler is $66,600 and its efficiency-adjusted price of fuel is 1408Poil. The price of the third boiler is $68,700; it has 
the same thermal efficiencies as the single-fuel boilers: its efficiency-adjusted price of fuel is 1469Pgaz when it burns 
gas and 1408Poil when it burns oil. Furthermore, there is a fixed cost S to switch fuels in any direction. 
 
When the ratio of the price of gas over the price of fuel is higher than 1.04 (1469/1408) it is less costly to operate the 
oil boiler than the gas boiler, or to operate the third boiler in the oil mode rather than in the gas mode, and vice versa. 
In fact if the relative price of gas is sufficiently above that ratio for a long enough time, the operating cost advantage 
of the oil boiler over the gas boiler may offset its higher acquisition price. 
 
What additional value does the dual-fuel technology confer to the firm? In practice the fuel price ratio typically be-
haves as in Figure 1: it often crosses the 1.04 value. However it is not clear that the price ratio stays on either side of 
1.04 for long enough to justify incurring the fixed switching cost, nor is it clear that it ever stays far enough on either 
side of 1.04 for substantial cost differences to arise between the oil and the gas regimes. Intuitively the higher the 
switching cost S, the further the price ratio must move away from the critical 1.04 value, and the longer it needs to 
stay far away from 1.04, for a switch to be warranted.  
 
A formal analysis gives a precise content to that intuition: as shown in Figure 1, there are two critical values of the 
price ratio. One of them, Pg, governs switches from oil to gas; it is lower than 1.04 and lies further away from that 
value, the higher the switching cost. The other critical value of the price ratio, Pp, governs switches from gas to oil; it 
is higher than 1.04 and lies further away from that value, the higher the switching cost. Not surprisingly for users of 
the real options approach, the two trigger price ratios move further away from the 1.04 value as uncertainty 
(volatility) increases.  
 
 
The decision rule just described maximizes the profit derived from the dual technology. By comparing this profits 
with the profits achieved if the best one-fuel technology at the current price ratio is used instead of the dual-fuel tech-
nology, one can compute the additional value conferred to the firm by the dual-fuel technology. The difference is the 
value of the flexibility option contained in the dual-fuel technology.  
 
Clearly, if the price ratio were constant, one of the one-fuel technologies would always be best; the value of flexibil-
ity would be zero. Generally, the higher the volatility, the higher the value of the flexibility option. As a matter of 
fact, flexibility is not limited to technological, operational, flexibility. Most business decisions, especially strategic 
decisions, involve trading resources against flexibility. The Real Options approach may help evaluate them. 
 
Uncertainty is usually seen as depressing profits and minds. The Real Options approach emphasizes the opposite. A 
firm may be modeled as holding various options. As in the above example, these options take more value as uncer-
tainty increases and so does the firm. 






The analysis of the fuel switching option has established, at any time or, equivalently, at any fuel prices, the value of 
the ability to switch in the future. Thus a firm considering the purchase of a boiler can compare at any date the value of 
the flexibility option with the acquisition cost premium associated with the dual-fuel technology and decide which is 
best.  
If the flexibility option is worth more than the difference between the cost of acquisition of the dual-fuel burner and 
the cost of acquiring the alternative one-fuel burner, it does not follow that the firm must go ahead with the investment. 
At any date the manager must decide whether it is time to buy, or whether it is preferable to wait in order to avoid re-
gretting the decision in case the price ratio evolves unfavorably. Once the investment is realized it is irreversible: real-
izing the investment involves a loss of valuable flexibility. The foregone option to wait must be included as a cost of 
the project. This is where the Real Options approach again modifies the conventional NPV approach. 
More contextual information is necessary to address this issue. We need to know the value of the production of the 
proposed boiler in order to evaluate the opportunity cost of waiting. Here the boiler allows the firm to substitute its 
own energy production for purchased electricity. There may be two main reasons to buy a boiler: purchased electricity 
is becoming more expensive; or boilers are becoming cheaper to acquire or operate.  
Let us focus on the price of purchased electricity Pe. If that price is very low, it is clear that no boiler needs to be pur-
chased. This suggests that there is a threshold price of electricity below which the manager should wait and above 
which the manager should go ahead with the acquisition of a boiler. In that case the analysis of the previous section 
indicates that the choice between the three types of boilers depend on the fuel price ratio, as indicated in Figure 1.  
Clearly, since the dual fuel boiler is more expensive, the threshold electricity price warranting its acquisition is higher 
than in the case of  single fuel boilers. This suggests that the threshold electricity price depends on the fuel price ratio, 
as drawn in Figure 2. Figure 2 is based on a conjecture that could only be confirmed and made precise through a com-
plete Real Options analysis. The blue curve that separates the ‘wait’ domain from the ‘Buy gas boiler’ domain is up-
ward sloping because, the closer the fuel price ratio is to the PPg value above which the dual boiler is a better buy than 
the gas boiler, the more likely it is that the fuel price ratio will go over the line in the future: if this happens and the 
manager has purchased a gas boiler, that decision will turn out to be a mistake. To protect himself against such mis-
take, the manager extends the waiting period by requiring a higher electricity price when the fuel price ratio is close to 
PPg. In fact, when the fuel price ratio is very close to PPg, the possibility of making a mistake by buying one type of 
boiler rather than the other is so high, that the manager prefers waiting even at high electricity prices, i.e. despite a 
high opportunity cost of waiting. 
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Figure 2. Boiler Buying Rule
wait
When electricity price is low it is preferable to buy electricity rather than produce it from one’s own
boiler; at high electricity prices it is preferable to operate a boiler. Which boiler? Above which electricity
price?  When the price of gas is low relative to the price of oil, chances of buying the wrong boiler are
low; thus the gas boiler should be bought at a relatively low electricity price. However, when the gas/oil
price ratio is closer to PPg, it is more likely to cross the PPg line in the future, which would imply that the
manager would prefer owning a dual boiler and would regret having acquired a gas boiler. To avoid the
mistake of buying the wrong boiler, the manager requires a higher electricity price to make the
irreversible decision.
Thus the line separating the “wait” locus from the “buy gas boiler” locus is upward slopping. Similarly
when the gas/oil price ratio is only slighly above PPg,, buying a dual boiler might turn out to be a mistake
if the ratio drops below PPg: thus the manager cautiously requires a higher electricity price than if the
gas/oil price ratio was “safely” around 1.04.
Figure 1.  Sample History of the Price Ratio and Switching rules
The price of natural gas equals the price of No. 2 fuel oil, on an efficiency-adjusted basis,
when the price ratio equals 1.04. The option to switch fuel inputs is more valuable if the
efficiency-adjusted price ratio frequently crosses the point of equality.
Po is the fuel price ratio at which the dual burner should be switched to oil when the relative price
of gas is going up; Pg is the ratio at which the dual burner should be switched to gas when the










Best buy: gas boiler

























The Real Options approach may bring the discipline and accu-
racy of finance into various areas of decision-making. That 
approach is relevant to a very large array of management and 
strategic decisions involving uncertainty and irreversibility. 
This is why many pioneer firms are starting to use it to take 
better advantage of a proactive type of management and create 
value. 
 
Implementing a Real Options approach is not easy however. 
The standard procedures used in finance must often be adapted 
or replaced with other techniques. Each application of the Real 
Options approach is likely to be context specific. The available 
options must be envisaged and described; the relevant infor-
mation must be identified and collected carefully; the execu-
tive using a Real Options approach must have the required 
knowledge and training to adapt standard procedures to each 
particular situation. Perhaps most importantly the Real Options 
approach is a state of mind, a capacity and willingness to de-
tect decisions that create opportunities or protect against mis-
haps, and act upon them in order to create value for the firm. 
 
For managers with such a state of mind, the Real Options ap-
proach is a tool that allows them better to bring intuition in 
line with the prescriptions of conventional decision-making 
procedures. More importantly it allows them to give a more 
accurate quantitative content and value to intuitive rules, thus 
gaining an edge over competitors. 
 
A financial option is the right but not the obligation to a 
payment in the future based on the value of an underly-
ing asset. Financial options are hugely important securi-
ties, which allows investors to construct portfolios with 
virtually any desired pay-off profile, and thus enables 
investors to implement any view of the market--however 
sophisticated. Examples include Bull and Bear spreads 
(market will go up or down), Butterfly spreads (market 
will be tranquil), Straddle combinations (market will be 
volatile), Strips and Straps (market will be volatile but is 
more likely to go down than up and vice versa). A key 
feature of all these strategies is that the downside is lim-
ited when a long position is taken. This illustrates an-
other key feature: Options can not only help taking 
speculative views in the market, they can help managing 
risk as well. If one is long in equity but worried about an 
impending stock market crash, buying out-of-the money 
puts is an effective and relatively cheap insurance pol-
icy. 
Financial Options as insurance 
 
CONCLUSION
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